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Abstract. This paper presents a novel idea of automatic fault localization by
exploiting counterexamples generated by a model checker. The key insight is
that, if a candidate statement is faulty, it is possible to modify (i.e. correct) this
statement so that the counterexample is eliminated. We have implemented the
proposed fault localization algorithm for component-based systems modelled in
the BIP (Behaviour, Interaction and Priority) language, and conducted the first
experimental evaluation on a set of benchmarks with injected faults, showing that
our approach is promising and capable of quickly and precisely localizing faults.
1 Introduction
The rigorous system design process in BIP starts with the high-level modelling of ap-
plication software. The final system implementation is then derived from the high-level
system model by a series of property preserving model transformations, taking into ac-
count the architectural features of execution platform. Thus, correctness of the system
implementation with respect to essential safety properties follows from the correct-
ness of high-level system models, which can be guaranteed by applying verification
techniques [2, 12]. When a counterexample is found, showing that the system model
violates the required properties, designers manually investigate it in order to fix the
model. However, the counterexample generated by a model checker can be large, re-
quiring considerable effort to localize the fault. It is thus desirable to provide a method
for automatic localization of faults to streamline the rigorous system design process.
Existing fault localization techniques [10] are mostly statistical. They are generally
referred to as Spectrum-based Fault Localization (SFL) [11]. In order to identify suspi-
cious locations, they require a considerable number of test cases, including both passed
and failed ones. When only a few tests are available, these techniques become impre-
cise. In [1], the authors exploit the difference between counterexamples and successful
traces to localize faults in the program. The faults are those transitions that do not appear
in the correct traces. In [7], the authors propose to instrument the program with addi-
tional diagnosis variables and perform model checking on this modified program. The
valuation of diagnosis variables indicates the location of a fault, when a counterexam-
ple is found. In [8], the authors propose a reduction of the fault localization problem to
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the maximum Boolean satisfiability problem extracted from the counterexample trace.
The solution of the satisfiability problem provides a set of locations that are potentially
responsible for the fault.
In this paper, we focus on component-based systems modelled in BIP. In contrast
with the work cited above, our approach does not require neither test inputs, nor instru-
mentation of the model. Instead, it exploits the counterexample generated by a model
checker. It reports the exact location, where the fault could be corrected instead of a set
of suspicious locations.
The key insight of our approach stems from the observation that a statement in the
counterexample is faulty if it is possible to modify (i.e. correct) this statement so that the
counterexample is eliminated. Given a counterexample—that is an execution trace that
violates the desired property—we first assume that this counterexample is spurious,
meaning that its postcondition is false.5 Our algorithm then proceeds by propagating
this postcondition backwards, computing the weakest preconditions of the statements
that form the execution trace, until it reaches a statement that interferes with the propa-
gated postcondition. We mark this statement as a candidate fault location. In the second
phase, the algorithm symbolically executes the counterexample trace from the initial
state to the candidate faulty statement, which results in a symbolic state. This symbolic
state, together with the candidate faulty statement and the propagated postcondition
form a Hoare triple. We say that the candidate faulty statement is a fault if this state-
ment can be modified to make the Hoare triple valid. Since the postcondition of the
resulting trace is false, the counterexample is eliminated.
We remark that BIP is an expressive intermediate modelling language for
component-based software. Industrial languages, used, for instance, for the design of
Programmable Logic Controller software [5], can be encoded into BIP. This opens the
possibility of applying our fault localisation approach to real-life industrial programs.
2 The BIP language
The BIP framework advocates strong separation of computation and coordination con-
cerns. To this end, the BIP language provides a modelling formalism based on three
layers: Behaviour, Interaction and Priority. Behaviour is characterised by a set of atomic
components, modelled by automata extended with linear arithmetic. Transitions are la-
belled by ports, used for synchronization and data transfer with other components. Co-
ordination is specified by interaction and priority models. An interaction model is a set
of interactions, representing guarded strong synchronizations of transitions of atomic
components. An interaction is a triple, consisting of a sets of ports to be synchronized, a
Boolean guard and an assignment statement updating the variables of the participating
components. When several interactions are enabled simultaneously, priority can be used
to reduce non-determinism and decide which interaction will be executed. We refer to
[2, 4] for the formal presentation of the BIP framework and operational semantics.
Example 1. We model in BIP the ticket mutual exclusion algorithm [9] with two pro-
cesses. A graphical representation is shown in Fig. 1. Each process gets a ticket from
5 We assume the readers to be familiar with the notions of Hoare triple and weakest precondition.
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the controller by taking its corresponding request transition (e.g. request1 in the
leftmost component in Fig. 1), and stores it in its buffer variable (e.g. buffer1). When the
ticket held by the process is equal to the number to be served (represented by the guards
[ticketN = next], with N = 1, 2, on the interactions in Fig. 1), the process can enter
the critical location (i.e. S3) by taking the enter transition. The controller keeps track
of the latest ticket it issues in the number variable and the next ticket to be served in
the next variable. These variables are increased by one when a process requests a ticket
or leaves the critical location, respectively. The mutual exclusion property requires that
the two processes never be in the critical locations simultaneously.
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Fig. 1. Ticket mutual exclusion algorithm in BIP
For the sake of conciseness, in Section 3, we will denote the request ports of
the controller and the two process components r, r1 and r2, respectively. Similarly, we
will use e, e1, e2 for the enter ports; t1, b1, t2, b2 for the variables of the two process
components; n and x for the number and next variables of the controller component.
3 Overview of the algorithm
We inject a fault in the model presented in Example 1 by modifying the assignment
of transition r2 to be t2 := b2 − 1. The mutual exclusion property is then violated
by the sequence of interactions 〈γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4〉, where γ1 = ({r, r1}, true, b1 := n),
γ2 = ({r, r2}, true, b2 := n), γ3 = ({e, e1}, t1 = x, skip), γ4 = ({e, e2}, t2 =
x, skip). We first build a sequential execution of this counterexample by serializing the
statements associated with interactions and their participating transitions: cex = 〈b1 :=
n; t1 := b1; n := n+1; b2 := n; t2 := b2−1; n := n+1; assume(t1 = x∧t2 = x)〉.
Our first observation is that if a statement is faulty, it is possible to modify it so
that the counterexample is eliminated. However, this can also be the case for a correct
statement: e.g. replacing n := n + 1 in the transition r of the controller component
by n := n eliminates the above counterexample. To avoid this, we use the following
characterisation of faults. We say that a statement s interferes with a predicate ϕ if the
Hoare triple {ϕ}s{ϕ} is invalid. Given a counterexample cex, we call a statement s
faulty, if 1) it interferes with the predicate ϕ obtained by backward propagation of false
along cex through the computation of weakest preconditions and 2) it is possible to
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eliminate cex by modifying s. We explain the idea by applying our algorithm to the
counterexample above.
We start by computing the weakest precondition of false for the assume statement:
wp(false, assume(t1 = x ∧ t2 = x)) = (t1 6= x ∨ t2 6= x). According to our fault
model for BIP (Section 4), an assume statement cannot be a fault candidate. Therefore,
we proceed to the statement n := n + 1, which is a fault candidate. Since wp(t1 6=
x ∨ t2 6= x, n := n + 1) = (t1 6= x ∨ t2 6= x), n := n + 1 does not interfere with the
predicate (t1 6= x∨t2 6= x). Hence it is not faulty and we proceed to the next statement.
Since wp(t1 6= x ∨ t2 6= x, t2 := b2 − 1) = (t1 6= x ∨ b2 − 1 6= x) is not implied by
t1 6= x ∨ t2 6= x, we conclude that t2 := b2 − 1 interferes with this latter predicate.
To check if this statement is the fault, we replace it by t2 := v, where v is a fresh
variable, and compute its precondition by symbolically executing the fragment preced-
ing t2 := b2 − 1, (i.e. 〈b1 := n; t1 := b1; n := n + 1; b2 := n〉), which results in
b1 = 1 ∧ t1 = 1 ∧ n = 2 ∧ x = 1 ∧ b2 = 2 ∧ t2 = 0. We now have to check whether
there exists a valuation of v that makes the Hoare triple {b1 = 1∧ t1 = 1∧n = 2∧x =
1 ∧ b2 = 2 ∧ t2 = 0} t2 := v {t1 6= x ∨ t2 6= x} valid, which would ensure the
elimination of the counterexample cex. This is, indeed, the case, since the implication
b1 = 1 ∧ t1 = 1 ∧ n = 2 ∧ x = 1 ∧ b2 = 2 ∧ t2 = 0→ wp(t1 6= x ∨ t2 6= x, t2 := v)
is satisfiable. Thus we conclude that the statement t2 := b2 − 1 associated with the
transition r2 is the fault responsible for the counterexample cex.
4 Fault localization algorithm for BIP
Since the synchronization aspect of interaction models is memoryless and can be syn-
thesized from high-level properties [3], it is reasonable to assume that coordination is
correct and focus on the faults in the assignment statements. We assume that there is
at most one fault, which can occur in the right-hand side of an assignment, and we
do not consider missing-code faults. Although these assumptions are quite strong, they
are satisfied by a considerable number of realistic models. In fact, our fault model is
quite similar to the faulty expression model widely used for fault localization in C pro-
grams [7], where the control flow of the program is assumed to be correct, but the
expressions may be wrong.
Our algorithm (Algorithm 1) utilizes a model checker or a symbolic executor as a
subroutine to detect a counterexample (line 1). When a counterexample is generated,
a sequential execution trace tr is constructed (line 5). Then for each statement s in
tr, we compute the weakest precondition pre of s with respect to post, initially set to
false (lines 6, 8, 17, 19). If s is suspicious (i.e. it is admitted by our fault model) and
interferes with its postcondition (line 9), we check whether it is possible to modify it to
eliminate cex. To this end, we compute s′ = Modify(s) (line 10), which replaces the
right-hand side of s by a fresh variable. We symbolically execute the counterexample
until s (lines 11–12). Notice that the same statement may appear in the prefix due to
the presence of a loop. Finally, we check whether the symbolic state st implies the
weakest precondition pre′ of s′ (lines 13–14). If the implication is satisfiable, there
exists a replacement s′ of s that eliminates cex and s is the fault (line 16). Otherwise,
we propagate the postcondition backwards and proceed to the next statement.
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Algorithm 1 Automatic fault localization algorithm
Input: A BIP model B with the encoding of safety property
Output: Either no counterexample is found or potential fault is suggested
1: cex← CounterexampleDetection(B)
2: if cex is Null then
3: return ‘No counterexamples found’
4: else
5: tr ← SequentialExecution(cex)
6: post← false
7: for each s in tr do
8: pre←WeakestPrecondition(post, s)
9: if s is suspicious and post→ pre is invalid then
10: s′ ← Modify(s)
11: prefix ← PrefixExecution(tr, s)
12: st← SymbolicExecute(prefix , s)
13: pre′ ←WeakestPrecondition(post, s′)
14: if st→ pre′ is satisfiable then
15: return ‘s is the fault location’
16: else
17: post← pre
18: else
19: post← pre
5 Experimental evaluation
We have implemented the proposed algorithm based on an existing model checker [2],
and adopted several benchmarks from the same work for the experimental evaluation.
We also used industrial benchmarks [5] and the TCAS test suite [6], which is widely
used by the fault localization community. Faults are injected into all benchmarks by
modifying some assignments in the transitions of atomic components. Due to the space
limitation, we refer the reader to our website6 for further detail.
All the experiments have been performed on a 64-bit Linux PC with a 2.8 Ghz Intel
i7-2640M CPU, with a memory limit of 4Gb and a time limit of 300 seconds. The
results are listed in Table 1, which shows that our algorithm has quickly and precisely
localized the faults in all considered benchmarks. The second column of Table 1 shows
the number of lines of the BIP model; the third shows the exact location (i.e. line
number) of the fault in the program; in the forth,
√
indicates that our algorithm has
localized the fault successfully; the fifth shows the time of performing fault localization,
which remains stable with the size of the benchmarks. This can be explained by the fact
that our algorithm uses counterexamples, rather than the models themselves. The last
column shows the total time of detecting and localizing the fault.
6 Conclusion
Fault localization techniques based on formal methods are attracting attention. In this
short paper, we have presented a novel automatic fault-localization algorithm for sin-
6 http://risd.epfl.ch/fault-localisation
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Table 1. Experimental results
Benchmark LOC Fault Location Result FaultLoc Time (s) Total Time (s)
atm transaction system 90 L57
√
0.004 0.036
ticket algorithm 89 L54
√
0.008 0.024
gate control system 80 L51
√
0.004 0.244
bakery algorithm 77 L41
√
0.004 0.048
plc code1 162 L98
√
0.004 0.040
plc code2 76 L46
√
0.004 0.016
plc code3 133 L96
√
0.008 1.144
simple c code 68 L32
√
0.004 0.020
tcas 197 L140
√
0.008 0.700
gle assignment faults in BIP models. Our first experimental evaluation shows that the
algorithm is promising: under some admittedly strong, but realistic assumptions, it is
capable of quickly and precisely localizing faults. In the future work, we are planning
to explore the possibilities of relaxing these assumptions, perform further experimen-
tal evaluation, and investigate the possibilities of automatically repairing the detected
faults.
References
1. Ball, T., Naik, M., Rajamani, S.K.: From symptom to cause: Localizing errors in counterex-
ample traces. In: POPL (2003)
2. Bliudze, S., Cimatti, A., Jaber, M., Mover, S., Roveri, M., Saab, W., Wang, Q.: Formal veri-
fication of infinite-state BIP models. In: ATVA (2015), to appear
3. Bliudze, S., Sifakis, J.: Synthesizing glue operators from glue constraints for the construction
of component-based systems. In: Apel, S., Jackson, E. (eds.) Software Composition. LNCS,
vol. 6708, pp. 51–67. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg (2011)
4. Bliudze, S., Sifakis, J., Bozga, M.D., Jaber, M.: Architecture internalisation in BIP. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 17th International ACM Sigsoft Symposium on Component-based Software
Engineering. pp. 169–178. CBSE ’14, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2014)
5. Darvas, D., Ferna´ndez Adiego, B., Vo¨ro¨s, A., Bartha, T., Blanco Vin˜uela, E.,
Gonza´lez Sua´rez, V.M.: Formal verification of complex properties on plc programs. In: For-
mal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components and Systems (2014)
6. Do, H., Elbaum, S., Rothermel, G.: Supporting controlled experimentation with testing tech-
niques: An infrastructure and its potential impact. Empirical Software Engineering (2005)
7. Griesmayer, A., Staber, S., Bloem, R.: Automated fault localization for c programs. Electron.
Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. (2007)
8. Jose, M., Majumdar, R.: Cause clue clauses: Error localization using maximum satisfiability.
In: PLDI (2011)
9. Lynch, N.A.: Distributed Algorithms (1996)
10. Mao, X., Lei, Y., Dai, Z., Qi, Y., Wang, C.: Slice-based statistical fault localization. Journal
of Systems and Software (2014)
11. Naish, L., Lee, H., Ramamohanarao, K.: A model for spectra-based software diagnosis. ACM
Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (2011)
12. Sifakis, J.: Rigorous system design. Foundations and Trends in Electronic Design Automa-
tion (2013)
6
